Falsification of Cyber-Physical Systems with Robustness-Guided Black-Box
  Checking by Waga, Masaki
Falsification of Cyber-Physical Systems with
Robustness-Guided Black-Box Checking
Masaki Waga∗
National Institute of Informatics and the Graduate University for Advanced Studies
Chiyoda, Tokyo, Japan
mwaga@nii.ac.jp
ABSTRACT
For exhaustive formal verification, industrial-scale cyber-
physical systems (CPSs) are often too large and complex, and
lightweight alternatives (e.g., monitoring and testing) have
attracted the attention of both industrial practitioners and
academic researchers. Falsification is one popular testing
method of CPSs utilizing stochastic optimization. In state-
of-the-art falsification methods, the result of the previous
falsification trials is discarded, and we always try to fal-
sify without any prior knowledge. To concisely memorize
such prior information on the CPS model and exploit it, we
employ Black-box checking (BBC), which is a combination
of automata learning and model checking. Moreover, we en-
hance BBC using the robust semantics of STL formulas, which
is the essential gadget in falsification. Our experiment re-
sults suggest that our robustness-guided BBC outperforms a
state-of-the-art falsification tool.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computer systems organization → Embedded and
cyber-physical systems; Real-time system specification;
• Software and its engineering→ Formal software verifi-
cation; Search-based software engineering.
KEYWORDS
cyber-physical systems, falsification, black-box checking,
automata learning, model checking, signal temporal logic,
robust semantics
∗JSPS Research Fellow
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not
made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear
this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components
of this work owned by others than ACMmust be honored. Abstracting with
credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to
redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request
permissions from permissions@acm.org.
HSCC ’20, April 22–24, 2020, Sydney, NSW, Australia
© 2020 Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-7018-9/20/04. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3365365.3382193
ACM Reference Format:
Masaki Waga. 2020. Falsification of Cyber-Physical Systems with
Robustness-Guided Black-Box Checking. In 23rd ACM International
Conference on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control (HSCC ’20),
April 22–24, 2020, Sydney, NSW, Australia. ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 20 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3365365.3382193
1 INTRODUCTION
Falsification of cyber-physical systems. Due to their safety-
critical nature, safety assurance of cyber-physical systems
(CPSs) is a vital problem. For exhaustive formal verification,
e.g., reachability analysis, industrial-scale cyber-physical sys-
tems (CPSs) are often too large and complex. Therefore non-
exhaustive but lightweight alternatives (e.g., monitoring and
black-box testing) have attracted the attention of both indus-
trial practitioners and academic researchers. Optimization-
based falsification is one of the search-based testing methods
to find bugs in CPSs, and many algorithms [15, 18, 43, 49–51]
have been studied. The problem is formulated as follows.
The falsification problem:
Input: a CPS modelM (given an input signal σ , it returns
an output signalM(σ )) and a specification φ of the CPS
modelM.
Problem: Find a violating input signal σ such that the cor-
responding output signalM(σ ) violates the specification
φ i.e.,M(σ ) ̸|= φ
The technical essence of optimization-based falsification is
to reduce CPS safety assurance to the simulation-based opti-
mization problem through the robust semantics [21] of signal
temporal logic (STL) formulas [37]. The robust semantics of
an STL formula shows a quantitative satisfaction degree: if
the robust semantics of an STL formula φ is negative, φ is
violated. Thus, the falsification problem can be solved by
minimizing the robust semantics of the given STL formula
φ using an optimization technique, e.g., covariance matrix
adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES) [6], through sim-
ulations. The analysis of differential equations tends to be
expensive, and falsification often finds a bug more efficiently
than formal verification of CPSs such as reachability analysis
of hybrid automata.
Thanks to the robust semantics of STL, optimization-based
falsification often falsifies an STL formula effectively even if
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Automata learning of
black-box systemM
(e.g., L* [4] or TTT [27])
Verify if
M˜ |= φ
by
model checking
Check if
M ≃ M˜
(typically by
testing)
DeemsM |= φ
Test if
M ̸|= φ is
witnessed
by σ
M ̸|= φ witnessed by σ
Learn
a Mealy machine M˜
M˜ |= φ
M , M˜
witnessed by σ
DeemsM = M˜
M˜ ̸|= φ
witnessed
by σ
No
(M , M˜ is
witnessed by σ )
Yes
Figure 1: A workflow of black-box checking [40, 44].
it is hard for a random testing. Falsification usually requires
many simulations to find a violating input signal. This can be
a problem due to the simulation cost of CPSs. A simulator of
a self-driving car—involving the obstacles (e.g., pedestrians
and other cars) and road conditions as well as the ego car—
typically runs in a speed that is more or less real-time. A
single simulation of it thus would take several seconds, at
least. Thus, we want to reduce the number of the simulations.
Black-box checking. Black-box checking (BBC) [44] or learning-
based testing (LBT) [40] is another testing method of black-
box systems. The speciality of BBC is the combination of
automata learning [9] and model checking [7]. As described
in [44], an outline of BBC is shown in Fig. 1. Here, a black-
box systemM : Σ∗ → (P(AP))∗ is a function from a discrete
input sequence ι ∈ Σ∗ to a sequence M(ι) ∈ (P(AP))∗ of
the sets of atomic propositions satisfied at each time. By
automata learning, a Mealy machine M˜ is constructed from
the previous simulation results (the top box of Fig. 1). The
learned Mealy machine M˜ is used to approximate the black-
box systemM. By model checking, one checks if the learned
Mealy machine M˜ satisfies the given property φ (bottom
center of Fig. 1). Since the behavior of the black-box system
M and the learned Mealy machine M˜ can be different, their
consistency is confirmed through additional simulations of
M (bottom left and right of Fig. 1). We note that the learned
Mealy machine M˜ is independent of the property φ, and we
can use the learned Mealy machine M˜ for model checking
of properties other than φ.
Thanks to the soundness of conformance testing used as
equivalence testing (left of Fig. 1), BBC can guarantee that
the given black-box system certainly satisfies the given prop-
erty [44] although the soundness relies on additional as-
sumptions on the black-box system (e.g., the upper bound of
the number of the states). A recent survey [25] reports that
at the early stage of the automata learning, it is beneficial
for the equivalence testing to try to find a counterexample
ι ∈ Σ∗ satisfyingM(ι) , M˜(ι) instead of trying to prove the
equivalence by conformance testing, e.g., W-method [11] and
Wp-method [23]. Random testing is one typical choice of the
equivalence testing other than conformance testing. Random
testing usually samples the inputs uniformly, and it is good
at covering various inputs. But, due to its uniform nature,
random testing is not good at finding rare counterexamples
existing only in a small area of the input space.
Robustness-guided black-box checking. Our contribution is
to combine optimization-based falsification and BBC aiming
at the improvement of both of them. We enhance BBC by
the robust semantics of STL, which is the essential gadget in
optimization-based falsification. We utilize BBC to solve the
falsification problem.
As an improvement of BBC, we employ the robust se-
mantics of STL to enhance the search of a counterexample
exploiting the following observation. If the CPSM violates
the given STL formula φ, but the learned Mealy machine M˜
satisfies φ, there exists a discrete input ι ∈ Σ∗ such that the
outputM(ι) ofM violates the specification φ, and we have
M(ι) , M˜(ι). Minimizing the robust semantics of φ, our
equivalence testing ofM and M˜ focuses on a subspace of
the input space where a counterexample more likely exists.
To minimize the robust semantics, we use, e.g., hill climbing
or genetic algorithms [34].
As an improvement of optimization-based falsification,
we aim at reducing the number of the simulations when
we try to falsify a CPS over multiple STL formulas. Multi-
ple STL formulas are used in falsification, e.g., because for
one abstract requirement in engineers’ minds, many STL
formulas realize it, and we want to try some STL formulas
out of them. Through the automata learning in BBC, we
reuse the knowledge on the CPS obtained when falsifying
other STL formulas, and reduce the number of the simula-
tions. See Section 6 for related works on model learning for
falsification.
Another big problem of optimization-based falsification is
that we can obtain very small information when we failed
to falsify it. Since BBC generates a learned Mealy machine
M˜ even if the given specifications are not falsified, we can
potentially use it to explain why the BBC failed.
We note that the existing robust semantics, e.g., [2, 17, 21],
are incompatible with the finite semantics of LTL in [12],
which is implemented in LTSMin [29]. Although the novelty
is limited, we define and employ a suitable robust semantics
of STL with a soundness and correctness theorem.
We implemented a prototypical tool FalCAuN for robustness-
guided BBC and compared its performance with: i) Breach,
which is one of the state-of-the-art falsification tools; and
ii) a baseline BBC using random search for the equivalence
testing. Our experimental result suggests that
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(1) on average, robustness-guided BBC using genetic algo-
rithm falsifies more properties Breach and the base-
line BBC method; and
(2) robustness-guided BBC is much more scalable than
Breach with respect to the number of the properties
we try to falsify.
Contributions. Our contributions are summarized as fol-
lows.
• By combining optimization-based falsification and black-
box checking (BBC), we proposed robustness-guided
BBC to improve both of them.
• We implemented a prototypical tool FalCAuN for robustness-
guided BBC.
• Our experimental results show that our robustness-
guided BBC outperforms baseline BBC and one of the
state-of-the-art falsification algorithms.
Organization. After reviewing some preliminaries in Sec-
tion 2, we show the robust semantics of STL in a discrete-time
setting in Section 3. This semantics is compatible with the
finite semantics of LTL in [12]. In Section 4, we show how to
enhance BBC by the robust semantics of STL, which is the
main contribution of this paper. We show our experimental
evaluation in Section 5. We review some related works in
Section 6. We conclude and show future works in Section 7.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Notations. For a set X , we denote its powerset by P(X ).
We denote the empty sequence by ε . For a set X , an infinite
sequencex = x0,x1, · · · ∈ Xω ofX , and i, j ∈ N satisfying i ≤
j, we denote the subsequence xi ,xi+1, . . . ,x j ∈ X ∗ by x[i, j].
For a set X , a finite sequence x ∈ X ∗ of X , and an infinite
sequence x ′ ∈ Xω of X , we denote their concatenation by
x · x ′. For a set X and its subsets X ′,X ′′ ⊆ X , we denote the
symmetric difference of X ′ and X ′′ by X ′ △ X ′′ = {x ∈ X |
x ∈ X ′,x < X ′′} ∪ {x ∈ X | x < X ′,x ∈ X ′′}. For a function
f : X → Y and a finite sequence x = x1,x2, . . . ,xn ∈ X ∗, we
let f : X ∗ → Y ∗ as f (x) = f (x1), f (x2), . . . , f (xn). For closed
intervals I1 = [a1,b1], I2 = [a2,b2] over R ∪ {±∞}, we let
−I1 = [−b1,−a1] and max(I1, I2) = [max(a1,a2),max(b1,b2)]
and min(I1, I2) = [min(a1,a2),min(b1,b2)].
2.1 LTL model checking
Linear temporal logic (LTL) [45] is a commonly used formal-
ism to describe temporal behaviors of an infinite or finite
sequence π ∈ (P(AP))∞ of a set πi ⊆ AP of atomic proposi-
tions representing valuations of atomic propositions.
Definition 2.1 (linear temporal logic). For the set AP of the
atomic propositions, the syntax of linear temporal logic (LTL)
is defined as follows, where p ∈ AP and i, j ∈ N ∪ {+∞}
satisfying i ≤ j.1
ψ ,ψ ′ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ψ | ψ ∨ψ ′ | ψ U[i, j) ψ ′ | Xψ
For an LTL formulaψ , an infinite sequenceπ = π0,π1, · · · ∈
(P(AP))ω of subsets of atomic propositions, and k ∈ N, we
define the satisfaction relation (π ,k) |= ψ as follows.
(π ,k) |= ⊤ (π ,k) |= p ⇐⇒ p ∈ πk
(π ,k) |= ¬ψ ⇐⇒ (π ,k) ̸|= ψ
(π ,k) |= ψ ∨ψ ′ ⇐⇒ (π ,k) |= ψ ∨ (π ,k) |= ψ ′
(π ,k) |= Xψ ⇐⇒ (π ,k + 1) |= ψ
(π ,k) |= ψ U[i, j) ψ ′ ⇐⇒ ∃l ∈ [k + i,k + j). (σ , l) |= ψ
∧∀m ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l}. (ψ ,m) |= ψ ′
We denote π |= ψ if we have (π , 0) |= ψ . An LTL formulaψ
is safety if for any infinite sequence π ∈ (P(AP))ω satisfying
π ̸ |= ψ , there exists i ∈ N, such that for any j > i and for
any π ′ ∈ (P(AP))ω , we have π [0, j] · π ′ ̸ |= ψ . For a safety
LTL formula ψ , the violation of ψ can be monitored by a
finite prefix π [0, i] ∈ (P(AP))∗ of π ∈ (P(AP))ω . In [12], the
finite semantics Jψ K of LTLψ is defined by the set of finite
prefixes potentially satisfying the propertyψ . We note that
this semantics is also utilized in the latest version of LTSMin.
Definition 2.2 (finite semantics of LTL [12]). For an LTL
formula ψ , Jψ K ⊆ (P(AP))∗ is the following set of finite
sequences of subsets of atomic propositionsJψ K = {π ∈ (P(AP))∗ | ∃π ′ ∈ (P(AP))ω . π · π ′ |= ψ }
Definition 2.3 (Mealy machine). For the input and output
alphabet Σ and Γ, a Mealy machine is a tupleM = (L, l0,∆),
where L is the finite set of locations, l0 ∈ L is the initial
location, and ∆ : (L × Σ) → (Γ × L) is the transition function.
For a Mealy machineM = (L, l0,∆) over Σ and Γ, the lan-
guage L(M) ⊆ (Σ × Γ)ω is L(M) = {(a0,b0), (a1,b1), · · · |
∃l1, l2, . . . ,∀i ∈ N. ∆(li ,ai ) = (bi , li+1)}. For an infinite sig-
nal σ = (a0,b0), (a1,b1), · · · ∈
(
Σ × Γ)ω , we let pr1(σ ) =
a0,a1, · · · ∈ Σω and pr2(σ ) = b0,b1, · · · ∈ Γω . For a Mealy
machineM, the input language Lin(M) ⊆ Σω and the out-
put language Lout(M) ⊆ Γω are Lin(M) = {pr1(σ ) | ∃σ ∈
L(M)} and Lout(M) = {pr2(σ ) | ∃σ ∈ L(M)}. We employ
a Mealy machine over Σ and P(AP) to model a system.
Definition 2.4 (LTL model checking). Let Σ be the input
alphabet and let AP be the set of the atomic propositions.
Given an LTL formulaψ over AP and a Mealy machineM
over Σ and P(AP), LTL model checking decides if we have
∀π ∈ Lout(M). π |= ψ . Moreover, it answers σ ∈ L(M)
satisfying pr1(σ ) ̸|= ψ if such σ exists. We denote ∀π ∈
Lout(M).π |= ψ byM |= ψ .
1In the standard definition of LTL, the interval [i, j) in U[i, j ) is always
[0, ∞) and it is omitted. We employ the current syntax to emphasize the
similarity to STL. We note that this does not change the expressive power.
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In the rest of this paper, we only consider safety LTL for-
mulas [35]. For any safety LTL formulaψ , if we haveM ̸|= ψ ,
there is a finite counterexample σ ∈ (Σ × P(AP))∗ such that
pr2(σ ) ∈ (P(AP))∗ \ Jψ K and there exists σ ′ ∈ (Σ×P(AP))ω
satisfying σ · σ ′ ∈ L(M). Thus, we use such a finite coun-
terexample σ ∈ (Σ×P(AP))∗ as a witness ofM ̸|= ψ . We let
Lfin(M) = {σ ∈ (Σ×P(AP))∗ | ∃σ ′ ∈ (Σ×P(AP))ω . σ ·σ ′ ∈
L(M)}.
2.2 Active automata learning
Active automata learning is an automata learning method
pioneered by L* algorithm [4], which learns the minimal
DFA AL over Σ recognizing the target language L ⊆ Σ∗. L*
algorithm learns a DFA through the queries to membership
and equivalence oracles. Given a wordw ∈ Σ∗, the member-
ship oracle answers ifw belongs to the target languageL i.e.,
w ∈ L. Given a candidate DFAA, the equivalence oracle an-
swers ifA recognizes the target language L i.e., L(A) = L,
where L(A) is the language of the candidate DFAA. When
A does not recognizeL, the equivalence oracle also answers
a counterexample w ∈ Σ∗ such that w ∈ L(A) △ L. We
note that a Mealy machineM can also be learned similarly.
See e.g., [47].
Equivalence testing. In practice, the target language L is
usually given as a black-box system, and a sound and com-
plete equivalence oracle is often unimplementable while the
given black-box system itself can be a membership oracle.
Therefore, we need an approximate strategy for equivalence
testing. For example, LearnLib [28] implements determinis-
tic exploration (e.g., complete, depth-bounded exploration),
random exploration (e.g., random words testing), and confor-
mance tests (e.g., W-method [11] and Wp-method [23]).
Alphabet abstraction. Another practical issue is that the
input and output alphabet can be huge or even infinite, and
the automata learning algorithm does not perform effectively
or does not terminate. For instance, the input and output of
a CPS model is usually real-valued signals, which are infin-
itely many. To overcome this issue, alphabet abstraction is
employed to reduce the alphabet size. For example, a variant
of Mealy machines is used to map the concrete and large
alphabet to the abstract and small alphabet in [1].
2.3 Black-box checking
Black-box checking (BBC) [44], is a black-box testing method2
combining model checking and active automata learning.
Given a black-box and potentially infinite locations Mealy
2Under some assumption, BBC is sound i.e., BBC proves the correctness of
the black-box system. See e.g., [38]. However, the soundness assumption
does not hold in most of the CPS application, and we use BBC just as a
testing method. See also Section 6.
machine M over Σ and P(AP), and a safety LTL formula
ψ , BBC deems M |= ψ or returns a counterexample σ ∈(
Σ × P(AP))∗ such that we have pr2(σ ) ∈ (P(AP))∗ \ Jψ K
and there exists σ ′ ∈ (Σ×P(AP))ω satisfying σ ·σ ′ ∈ L(M).
In contrast to the usual testing methods, BBC also constructs
a Mealy machine M˜ through automata learning. Thus, we
can reuse some part of the previous testing results through
the extracted Mealy machine M˜.
Fig. 1 shows a workflow of BBC. First, we learn a Mealy
machine M˜ from the black-box systemM by an automata
learning algorithm e.g., L* [4] or TTT algorithm [27]. We
note that the learned Mealy machine M˜ may behave dif-
ferently from the original black-box systemM because our
equivalence testing is an approximation, or even the equiva-
lence testingmight be omitted at this point. Then, we check if
we have M˜ |= ψ by model checking. If we have M˜ ̸|= ψ , we
also obtain a counterexample σ ∈ (Σ×P(AP))∗. We feed the
counterexample σ to the original systemM and check if σ is
a witness ofM ̸|= ψ , too. If σ is a witness ofM ̸|= ψ , we con-
cludeM ̸|= ψ and return the counterexample σ . Otherwise,
we have σ ∈ Lfin(M˜) but σ < Lfin(M), and we use σ to
refine our learning of M˜. If we have M˜ |= ψ , we check if the
behavior ofM and M˜ are similar enough by equivalence test-
ing. If we find a counterexample σ ∈ Lfin(M) △ Lfin(M˜),
we conclude that the learned Mealy machine M˜ is not simi-
lar enough to the original systemM, and we use σ to refine
our learning of M˜. If we could not find such σ , we deem
M˜ to be equivalent toM and returnM |= ψ , which is not
always correct.
3 DISCRETE-TIME SIGNAL TEMPORAL
LOGIC AND ROBUSTNESS
Signal temporal logic (STL) [37] is a formalism to represent
behavior of continuous-time, real-valued signals with quanti-
tative satisfaction degree called robust semantics [17]. Due to
the discrete nature of BBC, we need to represent discrete-time,
real-valued signals. In this section, we introduce discrete-time
STL, which is a variant of LTL for real-valued signals. We de-
fine the robust semantics for both infinite and finite signals.
Definition 3.1 (signal). For a finite set Y of variables, a sig-
nal σ ∈ (RY )∞ is a (finite or infinite) sequence of valuations
ui : Y → R. For a finite signal σ ∈ (RY )∗, we denote the
length n of σ = u0,u1, · · · ,un−1 by |σ |.
Definition 3.2 (signal temporal logic). For a finite set Y of
variables, the syntax of signal temporal logic (STL) is defined
as follows, where y ∈ Y , ▷◁ ∈ {>, <}, c ∈ R, and i, j ∈
N ∪ {+∞} satisfying i < j.
φ,φ ′ ::= ⊤ | y ▷◁ c | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ ′ | φ U[i, j) φ ′ | Xφ
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We use the following standard notation: ⊥ ≡ ¬⊤; y ≥ c ≡
¬(y < c); y ≤ c ≡ ¬(y > c); φ ∧ φ ′ ≡ ¬((¬φ) ∨ (¬φ ′));
φ ⇒ φ ′ ≡ (¬φ)∨φ ′;⊤Uφ ≡ ⊤U[0,∞)φ; ^[i, j)φ ≡ ⊤U[i, j)φ;
and □[i, j)φ ≡ ¬(^[i, j)¬φ).
For an STL formulaφ overY , an infinite signalσ = u0,u1, · · · ∈
(RY )ω over Y , and k ∈ N, the satisfaction relation (σ ,k) |= φ
is inductively defined as follows.
(σ ,k) |= ⊤ (σ ,k) |= y > c ⇐⇒ uk (y) > c
(σ ,k) |= y < c ⇐⇒ uk (y) < c
(σ ,k) |= ¬φ ⇐⇒ (σ ,k) ̸|= φ
(σ ,k) |= φ ∨ φ ′ ⇐⇒ (σ ,k) |= φ ∨ (σ ,k) |= φ ′
(σ ,k) |= Xφ ⇐⇒ (σ ,k + 1) |= φ
(σ ,k) |= φ U[i, j) φ ′ ⇐⇒ ∃l ∈ [k + i,k + j). (σ , l) |= φ
∧∀m ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l}. (φ,m) |= φ ′
The satisfaction relation (σ ,k) |= φ gives a qualitative
verdict of the satisfaction of the STL formula φ by the sig-
nal σ . The robust semantics ρ(φ,σ ,k) gives a quantitative
satisfaction degree of the STL formula φ by the signal σ .
Definition 3.3 (robust semantics). For an STL formula φ
over Y , an infinite signal σ = u0,u1, · · · ∈ (RY )ω over Y , and
k ∈ N, the robust semantics ρ(φ,σ ,k) ∈ R∪ {±∞} of the STL
formula φ and the signal σ at k is defined as follows.
ρ(⊤,σ ,k) = +∞ ρ(Xφ,σ ,k) = ρ(φ,σ ,k + 1)
ρ(y > c,σ ,k) =uk (y) − c ρ(y < c,σ ,k) = −uk (y) + c
ρ(¬φ,σ ,k) = − ρ(φ,σ ,k)
ρ(φ ∨ φ ′,σ ,k) =max(ρ(φ,σ ,k), ρ(φ ′,σ ,k))
ρ(φ U[i, j) φ ′,σ ,k) =
sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
min
(
ρ(φ ′,σ , l), min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
ρ(φ,σ ,m))
Theorem 3.4 (soundness and completeness). For an STL
formula φ over Y , an infinite signal σ = u0,u1, · · · ∈ (RY )ω
over Y , and k ∈ N we have the following.
ρ(φ,σ ,k) > 0⇒ (σ ,k) |= φ (σ ,k) |= φ ⇒ ρ(φ,σ ,k) ≥ 0
□
If we have (σ , 0) |= φ, we denote σ |= φ. The safety frag-
ment of STL is defined similarly to that of LTL. For an STL
formula φ, we define two finite semantics: the supremum
finite semantics JφK^ ⊆ (RY )∗ and the infimum finite seman-
tics JφK□ ⊆ (RY )∗. The supremum finite semantics JφK^ is
the set of prefixes potentially satisfying the property φ, and
corresponding to the finite semantics of LTL in [12]. The
infimum finite semantics JφK□ is the set of prefixes surely
satisfying the property φ.
Definition 3.5 (JφK^, JφK□). For an STL formula φ, the
supremum finite semantics JφK^ ⊆ (RY )∗ and the infimum
finite semantics JφK□ ⊆ (RY )∗ are defined as follows.JφK^ = {σ ∈ (RY )∗ | ∃σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω . σ · σ ′ |= φ}JφK□ = {σ ∈ (RY )∗ | ∀σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω . σ · σ ′ |= φ}
As the robust semantics for the finite signals, we employ
robust satisfaction interval (RoSI) [13].
Definition 3.6 (robust satisfaction interval). For an STL for-
mula φ over Y , a finite signal σ ∈ (RY )∗ over Y , and k ∈ N,
the robust satisfaction interval RoSI(φ,σ ,k) is the following
closed interval over R ∪ {±∞}.
RoSI(φ,σ ,k) =
[
inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ,σ · σ ′,k), sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ,σ · σ ′,k)
]
Theorem 3.7 (soundness and completeness). For an STL
formula φ over Y , a finite signal σ = u0,u1, · · · ,un−1 ∈ (RY )∗
over Y , and k ∈ N, we have the following.
sup(RoSI(φ,σ ,k)) > 0⇒ σ [k, |σ | − 1] ∈ JφK^
σ [k, |σ | − 1] ∈ JφK^ ⇒ sup(RoSI(φ,σ ,k)) ≥ 0
inf(RoSI(φ,σ ,k)) > 0⇒ σ [k, |σ | − 1] ∈ JφK□
σ [k, |σ | − 1] ∈ JφK□ ⇒ inf(RoSI(φ,σ ,k)) ≥ 0
□
One computational issue on the robust satisfaction inter-
val RoSI(φ,σ ,k) is that its definition is not inductive and
it is unclear if it is effectively computable. Instead, we use
the following inductive overapproximation [ρ](φ,σ ,k) of
RoSI(φ,σ ,k) as a quantitative satisfaction degree in ourmethod.
Definition 3.8 ([ρ](σ ,φ,k)). For an STL formulaφ overY , a
finite signal σ = u0,u1, · · · ,un−1 ∈ (RY )∗ over Y , and k ∈ N,
[ρ](φ,σ ,k) is the closed interval over R ∪ {±∞} inductively
defined as follows.
[ρ](⊤,σ ,k) = [+∞,+∞]
[ρ](y > c,σ ,k) =
{
[uk (y) − c,uk (y) − c] if k < |σ |
[−∞,+∞] if k ≥ |σ |
[ρ](y < c,σ ,k) =
{
[−uk (y) + c,−uk (y) + c] if k < |σ |
[−∞,+∞] if k ≥ |σ |
[ρ](¬φ,σ ,k) = −[ρ](φ,σ ,k)
[ρ](φ ∨ φ ′,σ ,k) = max([ρ](φ,σ ,k), [ρ](φ ′,σ ,k))
[ρ](Xφ,σ ,k) = [ρ](φ,σ ,k + 1)
[ρ](φ U[i, j) φ ′,σ ,k) =
max
l ∈{k+i,k+i+1, ...,k+j }
min
([ρ](φ ′,σ , l), min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
[ρ](φ,σ ,m))
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I/O Mapper
I : Σ→ RX
O : RY → P(AP)
CPS ModelM
e.g., Simulink model
Membership Oracle
ι ∈ Σ∗
σ = I(ι) ∈ (RX )∗
M(σ ) ∈ (RY )∗O(M(σ )) ∈ (P(AP))∗
Figure 2: Membership oracle for a CPS model using
alphabet abstraction: I and O are applied to each ele-
ment. See Section 2 for the notation I and O.
Theorem 3.9. For any STL formula φ over Y , a finite signal
σ = u0,u1, · · · ,un−1 ∈ (RY )∗ over Y , and k ∈ N, we have
RoSI(φ,σ ,k) ⊆ [ρ](φ,σ ,k). □
Corollary 3.10 justifies the use of [ρ](φ,σ , 0) as a quanti-
tative satisfaction degree of σ |= φ.
Corollary 3.10. Let φ be an STL formula over Y , let σ =
u0,u1, · · · ,un−1 ∈ (RY )∗ be a finite signal over Y , and k ∈ N.
If we have sup([ρ](φ,σ , 0)) < 0, for any σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω , we
have σ · σ ′ ̸ |= φ. If we have inf([ρ](φ,σ , 0)) < 0, there exists
σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω satisfying σ · σ ′ ̸ |= φ. □
4 BLACK-BOX CHECKING OF
CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
In this section, we show how to solve the falsification prob-
lem by BBC. Moreover, we enhance the membership testing
by the robustness in STL. This is our main contribution. Let
X andY be the finite sets of the input and output variables, re-
spectively. We define CPS modelM over (X ,Y ) as a function
M : (RX )∗ → (RY )∗ satisfying |σ | = |M(σ )|. The input sig-
nal σ ∈ (RX )∗ shows the inputs (e.g., the angle of the brake
pedal) at each time step, and the output signalM(σ ) ∈ (RY )∗
shows the states (e.g., the speed of the car) at each time step.
We solve the falsification problem using BBC, where the
given black-box system is a CPS modelM : (RX )∗ → (RY )∗.
Although the input and the output domain of the CPS model
M is continuous, we construct a Mealy machine M˜ with
finite input and output. In what follows, we present how to
implement themembership and equivalence oracles for CPSs,
and how we employ BBC to falsify multiple STL formulas.
We note that we can still use LTL model checking because
discrete-time STL can be interpreted as LTL and we assume
that there is a constant sampling rate for the CPS trajectories.
4.1 Membership oracle with alphabet
abstraction
Same as the usual BBC and automata learning for software
testing, we use the CPS modelM as the membership oracle.
As we discussed in Section 2.2, we have to abstract the al-
phabet due to the real-valued input and output ofM. As the
abstract input and output alphabets, we use a finite set Σ and
the power set P(AP) of atomic propositions, respectively.
Algorithm 1: Search-based equivalence testing
Input: CPS modelM : RX → RY , input mapper I : Σ→ RX ,
output mapper O : RY → P(AP), STL formula φ, and
Mealy machine M˜ : Σ∗ → (P(AP))∗
Output: Returns ι ∈ Σ∗ satisfying O(M(I(ι))) , M˜(ι), or ⊥
when no such ι was found
/* sample the initial population */
1 I ← genPopul()
2 until isTimeout() do
3 if ∃ι ∈ I .O(M(I(ι))) , M˜(ι) then
4 return ι
/* Generate the next population e.g., by random
sampling or robustness-guided optimization */
5 I ← genNextPopulation(I ,M,φ)
6 return ⊥
For simplicity, we employ a stateless mapper. Namely, for the
input alphabet Σ, we define the input mapper I : Σ→ RX ,
which assigns one input signal valuation to each a ∈ Σ, and
for the output alphabet P(AP), we define the output mapper
O : RY → P(AP), which returns the set of the atomic propo-
sitions satisfied for the given output signal valuation. We
apply I and O to each element of the sequences. See Fig. 2
for an illustration. We note that the construction of I and O
as well as the choice of the input alphabet Σ are done by a
user.
4.2 Robustness-guided equivalence testing
Aswe discussed in Sections 1 and 2.2, we need an equivalence
testing method to find a counterexample even if it is too rare
for random search. Algorithm 1 shows a general outline of
search-based equivalence testing (including random search)
of a CPS modelM and a Mealy machine M˜.
In random search, after randomly sampling the initial
inputs I ⊆ Σ∗ (line 1), we test the equivalence ofM and M˜
for each input ι ∈ I (line 3). If we find no counterexample,
we again randomly sample the next inputs I ⊆ Σ∗ (line 5)
and test the equivalence again. We repeat such a sampling
(line 5) and testing (line 3) until we find a counterexample ι
or we reach the timeout.
The main observation in robustness-guided equivalence
testing is as follows. If we have O ◦M ◦ I ̸|= φ and M˜ |= φ,
by a discrete input ι ∈ Σ∗ witnessing O ◦ M ◦ I ̸|= φ, we
can also witness O ◦M ◦ I , M˜, where ◦ is the function
composition. Thus, by minimizing the robustness of the CPS
modelM, we can guide the search to the inputs witnessing
the difference between O ◦M ◦ I and M˜. Specifically, in
line 5 of Algorithm 1, we use optimization to sample such
inputs I that makes the robustness of the CPS modelM low.
For example, we can use local search e.g., hill climbing and
genetic algorithm [34], where the objective is to minimize
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Algorithm 2: BBC for multiple specifications
Input: CPS modelM : RX → RY , input mapper I : Σ→ RX ,
output mapper O : RY → P(AP), and STL formulas
φ1,φ2, . . . ,φn .
Output: A set result of pairs (ιi ,φi ), where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}
and ιi ∈ Σ∗ is a witness ofM ̸|= φi .
1 result ← ∅; notFalsified ← {1, 2, . . . ,n}
/* Extract a Mealy machine from the actual CPS model
(above of Fig. 1) */
2 M˜ ← learnMealy(M)
3 repeat
4 cex ← ⊥
5 for i ∈ unfalsified do
/* Model checking (center of Fig. 1) */
6 if M˜ ̸|= φi then
7 ιi ← the witness of M˜ ̸|= φi
/* Feed ιi to M (right of Fig. 1) */
8 if M ̸|= φi is witnessed by ιi then
9 push (ιi ,φi ) to result
10 remove i from notFalsified
11 else cex ← ιi ; break
12 if cex = ⊥ then
13 for i ∈ unfalsified do
/* Search-based equivalence testing in
Section 4.2 (left of Fig. 1) */
14 cex ← searchEquivTest(M,I,O,φi , M˜)
15 if cex , ⊥ then
16 break
17 if cex , ⊥ then
18 M˜ ← learnMealy(M, M˜, cex)
19 until cex , ⊥
20 return result
sup([ρ](φ,σ , 0)). We can continue this optimization along
different equivalence testing calls by taking over the inputs
in line 1 instead of generating randomly.
4.3 BBC for multiple specifications
Algorithm 2 shows how we employ BBC to falsify multiple
STL formulas. In line 2, we extract a Mealy machine M˜ from
the CPS model M. Then, in line 6, for each STL formula
φi which is not falsified yet, we check if M˜ ̸|= φi holds
by LTL model checking. When M˜ ̸|= φi holds, we obtain
a witness ιi ∈ Σ∗ of M˜ ̸|= φi . In line 8, we check if ιi also
witnessesM ̸|= φi by checking if we haveO(M(I(ιi ))) ̸|= φi .
When ιi also witnesses M ̸|= φi , we store ιi in result as a
witness of M ̸|= φi . Otherwise, we have O(M(I(ιi ))) ,
M˜(ιi ), and we use ιi to refine the learned Mealy machine
M˜ (in line 18). When M˜ |= φi holds, in line 14, we use
the search-based equivalence testing (Algorithm 1) to find
cex ∈ Σ∗ satisfying O(M(I(cex))) , M˜(cex). When we find
such cex, we use it to refine the learned Mealy machine M˜
(in line 18). Otherwise, we deem O ◦M ◦I = M˜ and return
result as the final result: the set of the falsified specifications
φi with inputs ιi witnessingM ̸|= φi .
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We implemented a prototypical tool FalCAuN for robustness-
guided BBC of CPSs in Java using LearnLib [28], jMetal [19],
and LTSMin [29]. As the optimizationmethod in the robustness-
guided equivalence testing (i.e., line 5 of Algorithm 1), we
employ a hill climbing (HC) and the genetic algorithm [34]
(GA). In HC, for each discrete input sequence ι ∈ Σ∗ in
the current population set, we generate “children” input se-
quences by a random mutation. Then, we construct the next
population set by taking the children with the smallest ro-
bust semantics.HC is one of the simplest algorithm to exploit
the robust semantics, but we may get stuck in local optima.
In GA, we avoid local optima by using larger population
size and combining mutation, crossover, and selection. Our
implementation is in https://github.com/MasWag/FalCAuN.
We conducted experiments to answer the following re-
search questions.
RQ1 Does BBC falsify as many specifications as one of the
state-of-the-art falsification tools?
RQ2 For which equivalence testing, BBC performs the best?
RQ3 Does BBC falsify multiple specifications effectively?
Benchmarks. As the CPS modelM, we used the Simulink
model of an automatic transmission system [26], which is one
of the standardmodels in the literature on falsification. Given
a 2-dimensional signal of throttle and brake, the automatic
transmission model M returns a 3-dimensional signal of
velocity v , rotation ω, and gear д. The range of throttle and
brake are [0, 100] and [0, 325], respectively. The domains of
velocity v and rotation ω are reals, and the domain of gear д
is {1, 2, 3, 4}. As the specifications, we used the sets of the
STL formulas in Table 1. Each benchmark consists of multiple
and similar STL formulas. For example, φ1 consists of 6 STL
formulas and all of them are instances of the parametric
STL formula □(v < p). This setting reflects our motivating
example illustrated in Section 1: we do not know the exact
threshold in the specification and we want to test the CPS
model over various specification instances. The benchmarks
φ1–φ5 are taken from [50] and the benchmarks φ6 and φ7 are
our original.
Experiment. We compared the robustness-guided BBCmeth-
ods HC and GA with a baseline BBC method Random and
one of the state-of-the-art falsification tools Breach.
InHC, for each discrete input sequence ι in the current pop-
ulation, we generate 60 “children” discrete input sequences
by random swap: given a discrete input sequence ι = a1,a2, . . . ,an
HSCC ’20, April 22–24, 2020, Sydney, NSW, Australia Masaki, W.
Table 1: List of the STL formulas sets in our benchmarks. φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4, and φ5 are taken from [50]. The other
benchmarks are original. The STL formulas in φ6, tiny, φ6,small, φ6,medium, φ6, large, φ6,huge, and φ6,gigantic have the same
structure. These benchmarks aremainly used to compare the scalabilitywith respect to the size of the benchmark.
STL template parameter valuations size
φ1 □(v < p) p ∈ {100, 102.5, 105, 107.5, 110, 112.5, 115, 117.5, 120} 9
φ2 □(д = 3⇒ v > p) p ∈ {20, 22.5, 25, 27.5, 30} 5
φ3 ^[p1,p2](v < p3 ∨v > p4) (p1,p2) ∈ {(5, 20), (5, 25), (15, 30), (10, 30)}, (p3,p4) ∈ {(50, 60), (53, 57)} 8
φ4 □[0,26](v < p1) ∨□[28,28](v > p2) p1 ∈ {90, 100, 110},p2 ∈ {55, 65, 75} 9
φ5 □(ω < p1 ∨ X(ω > p2)) p1 ∈ {4000, 4700},p2 ∈ {600, 1000, 1500} 6
φ6, tiny □(v < p1 ⇒ □[0,p2](v < p3)) p1 ∈ {30, 40},p2 = 8,p3 = 80 2
φ6,small □(v < p1 ⇒ □[0,p2](v < p3)) p1 ∈ {30, 40},p2 = 8,p3 ∈ {70, 80} 4
φ6,medium □(v < p1 ⇒ □[0,p2](v < p3)) p1 ∈ {30, 40},p2 ∈ {8, 10},p3 ∈ {70, 80} 8
φ6, large □(v < p1 ⇒ □[0,p2](v < p3)) p1 ∈ {30, 40, 50},p2 ∈ {8, 10},p3 ∈ {70, 80} 12
φ6,huge □(v < p1 ⇒ □[0,p2](v < p3)) p1 ∈ {30, 40, 50},p2 ∈ {8, 10},p3 ∈ {60, 70, 80} 18
φ6,gigantic □(v < p1 ⇒ □[0,p2](v < p3)) p1 ∈ {30, 40, 50},p2 ∈ {6, 8, 10},p3 ∈ {60, 70, 80, 90} 36
φ7 □(((д , p1) ∧ X(д = p1)) ⇒ □[0,p2](д = p1)) p1 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},p2 ∈ {1, 2, 3} 12
random swap returns a1,a2, . . . ,ai−1,a,ai+1, . . . ,an , where
a ∈ Σ and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n} are randomly chosen. Among
the “children” discrete input sequences, 5 input sequences
realizing the smallest robust semantics are chosen to the next
population.
In GA, we used uniform mutation, uniform crossover, and
tournament selection. The population size, mutation proba-
bility, and crossover probability in GA are 150, 0.01, and 0.5,
respectively.
In Random, we used a random equivalence testing.
We used TTT algorithm [27] for active automata learning
in BBC. For the experiments on BBC, the timeout is 4 hours
in total. In BBC, the input length is fixed to 30. The abstract
alphabet Σ is |Σ| = 4 such that the throttle is either 0 or 100
and the brake is either 0 or 325. The atomic propositions
AP is the coarsest partitions of the output space (i.e., the
valuations of v ,ω, and д) compatible with the inequalities in
STL formulas in each benchmark.
We used Breach [16] version 1.5.2 as a baseline. Breach
provides several optimization algorithms including covari-
ancematrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES) [6], global
Nelder-Mead (GNM)[36], and simulated annealing (SA) [33].
Among them, we only used CMA-ES because it is reported
to outperform the other optimization methods in [51]. For
the experiment on Breach, the timeout is 15 minutes for
each specification. In Breach we generated piecewise con-
stant signals with 30 control points. We note that the signals
generated by Breach take floating-point values while the
discrete input sequences generated by FalCAuN take 4 val-
ues. Thus, the search space of Breach is larger but there can
be specifications falsifiable only by Breach.
Since the optimization algorithm in GA, HC, Breach as
well as the random sampling in Random are stochastic, we
executed each benchmark and algorithm for 10 times. For
each execution, we measured the number of the falsified
specifications and the time to falsify all the falsified specifi-
cations. For Breach, we used the sum of the time to falsify
all the falsified specifications. Table 2 shows the summary
of the experiment result. We also show the result of a pure
random sampling process (PureRandom) to confirm the
hardness of the benchmarks. We also note that φ1 and φ7
contain AT1 and a variant of AT5 specifications in [20]. Both
of the specifications are falsified by GA 10 times out of 10
trials. We conducted the experiments on an Amazon EC2
c4.large instance (2 vCPUs and 3.75 GiB RAM).
5.1 RQ1: Comparison with Breach
In Table 2, we observe that on average, GA falsified as many
properties as Breach does for any benchmark φi . HC also
falsified as many properties as Breach does for any bench-
markφi except forφ1. Even forφ1, the number of the falsified
properties of HC is comparable to that of Breach. We also
observe that Random falsified as many properties as Breach
except for φ1, φ6,medium, and φ6, large.
One reason of the good performance of GA andHC is that
the equivalence testing in these methods utilizes a discrete
optimization and tends to work well even if the different part
of the input sequence contributes to the robust semantics
differently. For example, in order to falsify φ4, we have to
find an input that makes the velocity high in the beginning
and suddenly decreases the velocity at 28 time units. Such an
optimization is not easy for continuous optimization methods
e.g., CMA-ES.
Another reason is that CMA-ES does not work well when
the fitness function has very small slope. For example, for
the benchmark φ2, when the gear is not 3, the change of the
robustness is almost discrete and the slope can be 0. This is a
difficult situation for many continuous optimizationmethods
based on the slope. Especially when the slope is too small,
CMA-ES stops deeming there is no better inputs. On the other
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Table 2: Summary of the experiment result. The numbers N /T in each cell are the number N of the falsified
specifications and the time T [min.] to falsify all the falsifiable specification. For each experiment setting, the
average and the standard deviation are shown. For each benchmark φi , the best cell in terms of the following
order is highlighted: N /T is better than N ′/T ′ if and only if we have N > N ′ or we have both N = N ′ and T < T ′.
For each benchmark, the largest average of the number of the falsified properties is shown in bold blue font.
PureRandom Random HC GA Breach
aver. # of spec. average std. dev. average std. dev. average std. dev. average std. dev.
φ1 5.70 8.80/11.10 0.60/2.73 8.90/28.53 0.30/49.81 9.00/68.96 0.00/64.64 9.00/12.05 0.00/0.19
φ2 0.00 4.90/75.99 0.30/45.98 4.80/82.56 0.40/61.28 4.90/74.12 0.30/77.88 2.00/0.20 0.00/0.00
φ3 0.00 8.00/9.34 0.00/2.88 8.00/12.68 0.00/4.45 8.00/12.87 0.00/4.96 8.00/22.43 0.00/0.58
φ4 0.60 6.10/100.83 0.70/76.80 5.90/124.88 0.70/73.43 6.90/163.03 0.30/24.56 2.60/22.37 0.80/7.41
φ5 2.40 6.00/139.72 0.00/132.73 3.30/72.99 2.49/124.15 6.00/133.66 0.00/140.54 3.00/5.78 0.00/0.45
φ6, tiny 2.00 2.00/2.24 0.00/1.14 2.00/2.44 0.00/1.11 2.00/3.54 0.00/1.47 2.00/3.12 0.00/0.09
φ6,small 4.00 4.00/2.98 0.00/1.38 4.00/2.58 0.00/1.44 4.00/3.20 0.00/1.03 4.00/4.41 0.00/0.18
φ6,medium 6.10 7.20/141.83 2.40/416.15 8.00/2.50 0.00/1.31 8.00/4.07 0.00/2.52 8.00/7.74 0.00/0.04
φ6, large 9.00 10.80/288.46 3.60/566.25 12.00/3.00 0.00/2.02 12.00/3.47 0.00/1.46 12.00/9.99 0.00/0.04
φ6,huge 12.00 18.00/2.36 0.00/1.21 18.00/2.00 0.00/0.74 18.00/3.21 0.00/0.78 18.00/12.45 0.00/0.06
φ6,gigantic 30.00 31.00/5.59 0.00/1.93 31.00/12.15 0.00/10.05 31.00/7.95 0.00/3.93 31.00/36.30 0.00/0.45
φ7 0.00 12.00/1.35 0.00/0.76 12.00/1.25 0.00/0.72 12.00/1.84 0.00/0.50 9.00/0.38 0.00/0.01
hand, the behavior of the robustness-guided equivalence
checking methods is much like the random search and it
successfully falsified the specifications.
5.2 RQ2: Best equivalence testing method
In Table 2, we observe that on average, the number of the
falsified properties of GA is greater than or equal to that
of Random and HC. Moreover, GA has smaller standard
deviation of the number of the properties than Random and
HC. This is because GA has a good balance of exploitation
of exploration and the equivalence testing tends have a good
performance constantly while Random and HC occasionally
fails to find a counterexample in the equivalence testing.
On the other hand, we also observe that GA tends not
to be the fastest among the BBC methods. This makes the
number of the highlighted cells of GA smaller than that of
HC and equal to that of Random although GA falsified the
largest number of properties. This is because the genetic
algorithm in GA is more complicated than the hill climbing
in HC and the random search in Random while these simple
optimization is enough for easy benchmarks. However, even
though GA is not the fastest BBC method, the additional
time caused by GA is only a few minutes and it is acceptable
for many practical usages. Therefore, we conclude that GA
performed the best among the three BBC methods.
5.3 RQ3: Effectiveness to falsify multiple
specifications
Fig. 3 shows the average of the number of the falsified proper-
ties and the time to falsify these properties for φ6, tiny, φ6,small,
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Figure 3: The average of the number of the falsified
properties and the time to falsify them [min.] for
φ6, tiny, φ6,small, φ6,medium, φ6, large, φ6,huge, and φ6,gigantic.
φ6,medium, φ6, large, φ6,huge, and φ6,gigantic. We observe that ex-
cept for φ6,medium and φ6, large of HC, the execution time of
the BBC algorithms tends to be shorter than that of Breach.
Especially, for φ6, tiny, φ6,small, φ6,medium, φ6, large, and φ6,huge,
we observe that the execution time of HC and GA is more or
less constant while the execution time of Breach increases
linearly. This is because in BBC, once we learn a sufficiently
accurate Mealy machine M˜, we often find counterexamples
for several specifications immediately. On the other hand,
in Breach, each falsification trial is independent and the
execution time increases linearly. We note that the huge ex-
ecution time of Random for φ6,small and φ6,medium is due to
the outliers as the large standard deviations suggest.
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Table 3: Result of falsification only using the extracted Mealy machine. The second column shows the number
of the counterexamples found by model checking of the Mealy machines M˜ extracted during the BBC. The third
column shows the number of the actual counterexamples confirmed through a simulation of the CPS modelM.
The fourth and the fifth columns show the average and the standard deviation of the robustness, respectively.
STL formula φ # of φ ̸ |= M˜ # of φ ̸ |=M Average of JφK std. dev. of JφK
□(v < 90) 10 5 1.10 1.94
□[0,26](v < 90) ∨□[28,28](v > 40) 4 0 4.19 0.00
□[0,26](v < 90) ∨□[28,28](v > 50) 10 0 3.80 0.60
□[0,26](v < 90) ∨□[28,28](v > 60) 10 0 3.24 0.76
Table 4: Average of the number of the states of the ex-
tracted Mealy machine
Random HC GA
φ1 181.90 270.90 441.50
φ2 612.60 661.60 610.00
φ3 154.20 200.20 198.30
φ4 1372.70 1194.70 1353.30
φ5 948.60 1442.14 888.60
φ6, tiny 26.60 32.10 35.20
φ6,small 45.30 40.60 39.50
φ6,medium 41.44 37.80 47.70
φ6, large 32.89 48.70 44.80
φ6,huge 41.20 36.70 44.80
φ6,gigantic 1912.00 1714.40 1891.10
φ7 24.00 21.10 20.00
5.4 Discussion on the extracted Mealy
machines
One natural question on BBC is whether the extracted Mealy
machine M˜ is a good approximation of the original sys-
temM. Especially, since the robustness-guided equivalence
testing focuses on the inputs realizing low robustness, it is un-
clear if the extracted Mealy machine M˜ behaves similarly to
the original systemM even for the inputs not realizing low
robustness. We note that as shown in Table 4, the extracted
Mealy machines tend to be huge and a manual inspection is
unrealistic.
In order to obtain insights on the aforementioned question,
we conducted the following additional experiments.
(1) For a Mealy machine M˜ generated through BBC and
an STL formula φ not used when M˜ is learned, we
conducted model checking to obtain a witness ι ∈ Σ∗
of M˜ ̸|= φ. We note that if we have M˜ |= φ, we cannot
obtain such ι.
(2) By feeding the generated witness ι ∈ Σ∗ to the original
system M, we checked if ι also witnesses M |= φ.
Precisely, we checked if we have O(M(I(ι))) |= φ by
running a simulation.
As the Mealy machines, we used the 10 Mealy machines
generated by GA with the benchmark φ6,gigantic. As the STL
formulas, we used variants of the STL formulas in φ1 and φ4.
Table 3 shows the experiment result. In the second column
of Table 3, we observe that we tend to be able to falsify the
STL formula φ with respect to the extracted Mealy machine
M˜. On the other hand, in the third column of Table 3, we
observe that the witness ι ∈ Σ∗ of φ ̸ |= M˜ is usually not a
witness of φ ̸ |= M. This suggests that if we directly reuse
a Mealy machine generated through BBC of different STL
formulas, falsification does not perform well. However, in
the fourth column, we observe that the robustness is much
smaller than the threshold in the STL formulas, and the
witness ι of φ ̸ |= M˜ actually witnesses “near violation” of
φ |= M˜. We note that this is not due to outliers as we observe
the small standard deviation in the fifth column, Therefore,
it seems that the extracted Mealy machine M˜ is not a very
precise abstraction of the original system M, but we can
potentially use M˜ as a rough approximation ofM.
6 RELATEDWORKS
Black-box checking (BBC) [44] (or learning-based testing
(LBT) [40]) is initially presented as a sound black-box testing
method utilizing Vasilevskii and Chow (VC) algorithm [11,
48] as the equivalence oracle. The correctness of the VC
algorithm relies on the upper bound of the size of the state
space of the black-box system. In [38], Büchi acceptance
condition in the state space of the black-box system is used
for the sound equivalence checking.
A great effort has been devoted to a more practical direc-
tion of BBC, including the testing of automotive systems.
For example, case studies on testing of automotive software
systems are shown in [32] and an application to the CPSs
with continuous dynamics is presented in [31, 39]. However,
up to our knowledge, there is no work exploiting the quanti-
tative satisfaction degree of the requirements in addition to
Boolean satisfaction. For BBC, as far as we are aware of, two
tools have been presented: LBTest [41] and an implementa-
tion [38] in LearnLib [28]. Our prototypical tool FalCAuN
relies on the implementation [38] in LearnLib.
Falsification is one of the well-known quality assurance
methods of CPSs with two well-matured tools: Breach [16]
and S-TaLiRo [5]. Moreover, a friendly competition [22] has
been held every year since 2017.
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Among many algorithms for falsification, only a few al-
gorithms utilize model learning. For example, in [14], for a
CPS modelM and an STL formula φ, a probabilistic model is
constructed to approximate the function from an input signal
σ to the robust semantics of φ over the output signalM(σ ),
and Bayesian optimization [10] is used to make falsification
efficient. In [3], deep reinforcement learning [42] is used for a
similar optimization. One drawback of these algorithms is
that the learned model depends on the STL formula φ, and it
is (at least) not straightforward to apply for the falsification
of multiple STL formulas.
In [30], reinforcement learning is used to falsify one speci-
fication for multiple but similar systems effectively. We note
that our BBC approach is also applicable for falsification of
multiple but similar systems by adaptive model checking [24].
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Combining optimization-based falsification and black-box
checking (BBC), we presented robustness-guided BBC, which
is a method to falsify multiple specifications efficiently. Our
main technical contribution is to use the robust semantics of
STL to enhance the equivalence testing in active automata
learning. Our experiment results suggest that robustness-
guided BBC by genetic algorithm (GA) tends to outperform
baseline algorithms of both optimization-based falsification
and BBC. Namely, we compared with Breach, which is one
of the state-of-the-art falsification tools, and Random, which
is a BBC method with random equivalence testing.
One future direction is to reuse the extracted Mealy ma-
chine M˜ for BBC over the STL formulas φ other than the
formulas φ ′ examined when M˜ is extracted. As we observed
in Section 5.4, M˜ may not be a good approximation ofM
for falsification of φ, but it seems M˜ roughly captures the
behavior ofM. Thus, we need to (hopefully only slightly)
refine M˜ to obtain a witness ofM ̸|= φ. When M˜ |= φ holds,
we have to find an input to refine M˜ by robustness-guided
equivalence testing. It is an interesting future work to make
this robustness-guided equivalence testing efficient utilizing
M˜. We note that when we have M˜ ̸|= φ, we can use the
counterexample obtained by the model checking to M˜. It is
also a future work to use M˜ to explain why the BBC failed.
Another future direction is an efficient falsificationmethod
over a family of similar systems using adaptive model check-
ing [24].
It is also a future work to conduct further detailed experi-
mental evaluation to compare with more tools by using the
ARCH-COMP benchmark [20], or to optimize some param-
eters. For example, for the alphabet size, there should exist
a trade-off between the computation cost and covering a
larger class of signals. For the input mapper, we used a very
simple input mapper in the explained as explained in Sec-
tion 5. Investigation of a good method to give an appropriate
alphabets or an input mapper is future work. It is also an
interesting future work to use an optimization-based confor-
mance testing of CPSs [46] instead of our robustness-guided
equivalence testing.
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A OMITTED PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Theorem 3.4. We prove by induction on the structure of φ.
When φ = ⊤, we have ρ(⊤,σ ,k)) = +∞ > 0 and (σ ,k) |= ⊤.
When φ = y > c , we have ρ(y > c,σ ,k) = uk (y) − c . If we have ρ(y > c,σ ,k) > 0, we have uk (y) − c > 0, and (σ ,k) |= y > c
holds. If we have (σ ,k) |= y > c , we have uk (y) − c > 0, and ρ(y > c,σ ,k) ≥ 0 holds.
Whenφ = y < c , we have ρ(y < c,σ ,k) = −uk (y)+c . If we have ρ(y < c,σ ,k) > 0, we have−uk (y)+c > 0, and (σ ,k) |= y < c
holds. If we have (σ ,k) |= y < c , we have −uk (y) + c > 0, and ρ(y < c,σ ,k) ≥ 0 holds.
When φ = ¬φ ′, we have ρ(¬φ ′,σ ,k) = −ρ(φ ′,σ ,k). If we have ρ(¬φ ′,σ ,k) > 0, we have ρ(φ ′,σ ,k) ≤ 0. Therefore, we
have (σ ,k) ̸|= φ ′ and we have (σ ,k) |= ¬φ ′. If we have (σ ,k) |= ¬φ ′, we have (σ ,k) ̸|= φ ′. By induction hypothesis, we have
(σ ,k) |= φ ′ < 0 and we have (σ ,k) |= ¬φ ′ ≥ 0.
When φ = φ ′ ∨ φ ′′, we have ρ(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ ,k) = max{ρ(φ ′,σ ,k), ρ(φ ′′,σ ,k)}. If we have ρ(φ ′ ∨ φ ′,σ ,k) > 0, we have
ρ(φ ′,σ ,k) > 0 or ρ(φ ′′,σ ,k) > 0. By induction hypothesis, we have (σ ,k) |= φ ′ or (σ ,k) |= φ ′′, and therefore, we have
(σ ,k) |= φ ′ ∨ φ ′′.
When φ = Xφ ′, we have ρ(Xφ ′,σ ,k) = ρ(φ ′,σ ,k + 1). If we have ρ(Xφ ′,σ ,k) > 0, we have ρ(φ ′,σ ,k + 1) > 0. By induction
hypothesis, we have (σ ,k + 1) |= φ ′ and therefore, we have (σ ,k) |= Xφ ′. If we have (σ ,k) |= Xφ ′, we have (σ ,k + 1) |= φ ′. By
induction hypothesis, we have ρ(φ ′,σ ,k + 1) ≥ 0, and therefore, we have ρ(Xφ ′,σ ,k) ≥ 0.
When φ = φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′, we have ρ(φ U[i, j) φ ′,σ ,k) = supl ∈[k+i,k+j)min
(
ρ(φ ′,σ , l),minm∈{k,k+1, ...,l } ρ(φ,σ ,m)
)
. If we have
ρ(φ U[i, j) φ ′,σ ,k) > 0, there exists l ∈ [k + i,k + j) such that we have ρ(φ ′,σ , l) > 0 and for any m ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l},
we have ρ(φ,σ ,m) > 0. By induction hypothesis, there exists l ∈ [k + i,k + j) such that we have (σ , l) |= φ ′ and for any
m ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l}, we have (σ ,m) |= φ. Therefore, we have (σ ,k) |= φ U[i, j) φ ′. If we have (σ ,k) |= φ U[i, j) φ ′, there exists
l ∈ [k + i,k + j) such that we have (σ , l) |= φ ′ and for anym ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l}, we have (σ ,m) |= φ. By induction hypothesis,
there exists l ∈ [k + i,k + j) such that we have ρ(φ ′,σ , l) ≥ 0 and for any m ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l}, we have ρ(φ,σ ,m) ≥ 0.
Therefore, we have ρ(φ U[i, j) φ ′,σ ,k) ≥ 0, □
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.7
First, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. For an STL formula φ over Y , a finite signal σ = u0,u1, · · · ,un−1 ∈ (RY )∗ over Y , and k ∈ N we have the following.
σ < JφK□ ⇐⇒ σ ∈ J¬φK^
σ < JφK^ ⇐⇒ σ ∈ J¬φK□
Proof. The first part is proved as follows.
σ < JφK□
⇐⇒ ¬(∀σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω . σ · σ ′ |= φ)
⇐⇒ ∃σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω . σ · σ ′ ̸ |= φ
⇐⇒ ∃σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω . σ · σ ′ |= ¬φ
⇐⇒ σ ∈ J¬φK^
The second part is proved as follows.
σ < JφK^
⇐⇒ ¬(∃σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω . σ · σ ′ |= φ)
⇐⇒ ∀σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω . σ · σ ′ ̸ |= φ
⇐⇒ ∀σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω . σ · σ ′ |= ¬φ
⇐⇒ σ ∈ J¬φK□
□
Theorem 3.7 is proved as follows.
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Theorem 3.7. We prove by induction on the structure of φ.
When φ = ⊤, we have sup(RoSI(⊤,σ ,k)) = inf(RoSI(⊤,σ ,k)) = +∞ > 0 and σ [k, |σ | − 1] ∈ (RY )∗ = J⊤K^ = J⊤K□.
When φ = y > c , we have the following.
sup(RoSI(y > c,σ ,k)) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(y > c,σ · σ ′,k) =
{
uk (y) − c if |σ | > k
+∞ if |σ | ≤ k
inf(RoSI(y > c,σ ,k)) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(y > c,σ · σ ′,k) =
{
uk (y) − c if |σ | > k
−∞ if |σ | ≤ k
If we have sup(RoSI(y > c,σ ,k)) > 0, we have uk (y) > c or |σ | ≤ k , and we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jy > cK^ .
If we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jy > cK^ , we have uk (y) > c or |σ | ≤ k , and thus, we have sup(RoSI(y > c,σ ,k)) ≥ 0.
If we have inf(RoSI(y > c,σ ,k)) > 0, we have |σ | > k and uk (y) > c , and we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jy > cK□.
If we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jy > cK□, we have |σ | > k and uk (y) > c , and thus, we have inf(RoSI(y > c,σ ,k)) ≥ 0.
When φ = y < c , we have the following.
sup(RoSI(y < c,σ ,k)) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(y < c,σ · σ ′,k) =
{
−uk (y) + c if |σ | > k
+∞ if |σ | ≤ k
inf(RoSI(y < c,σ ,k)) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(y < c,σ · σ ′,k) =
{
−uk (y) + c if |σ | > k
−∞ if |σ | ≤ k
If we have sup(RoSI(y < c,σ ,k)) > 0, we have uk (y) < c or |σ | ≤ k , and we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jy < cK^ .
If we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jy < cK^ , we have uk (y) < c or |σ | ≤ k , and thus, we have sup(RoSI(y < c,σ ,k)) ≥ 0.
If we have inf(RoSI(y < c,σ ,k)) > 0, we have |σ | > k and uk (y) < c , and we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jy < cK□.
If we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jy < cK□, we have |σ | > k and uk (y) < c , and thus, we have inf(RoSI(y < c,σ ,k)) ≥ 0.
When φ = ¬φ ′, we have the following.
sup(RoSI(¬φ ′,σ ,k)) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(¬φ ′,σ · σ ,k) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
−ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ,k)
= − inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ,k)
inf(RoSI(¬φ ′,σ ,k)) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(¬φ ′,σ · σ ,k) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
−ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ,k)
= − sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ,k)
If we have sup(RoSI(¬φ ′,σ ,k)) > 0, we have inf(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k)) < 0. By induction hypothesis, we have σ [k, |σ |] < Jφ ′K□. By
Lemma A.1, we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ J¬φ ′K^ .
If we haveσ [k, |σ |] ∈ J¬φ ′K^ , by LemmaA.1, we haveσ [k, |σ |] < Jφ ′K□. By induction hypothesis, we have inf(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k)) <
0, and thus, we have sup(RoSI(¬φ ′,σ ,k)) ≥ 0.
If we have inf(RoSI(¬φ ′,σ ,k)) > 0, we have sup(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k)) < 0. By induction hypothesis, we have σ [k, |σ |] < Jφ ′K^ and
by Lemma A.1. By Lemma A.1, we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ J¬φ ′K□.
If we haveσ [k, |σ |] ∈ J¬φ ′K□, by LemmaA.1, we haveσ [k, |σ |] < Jφ ′K^ . By induction hypothesis, we have sup(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k)) <
0, and thus, we have inf(RoSI(¬φ ′,σ ,k)) ≥ 0.
When φ = φ ′ ∨ φ ′′, we have the following.
sup(RoSI(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ ,k)) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k)
= sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
max
{
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,k), ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k)}
inf(RoSI(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ ,k)) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k)
= inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
max
{
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,k), ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k)}
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If we have sup(RoSI(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ ,k)) > 0, there exists σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω satisfying ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,k) > 0 or ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k) > 0.
By Theorem 3.4 there exists σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω satisfying (σ · σ ′,k) |= φ ′ or (σ · σ ′,k) |= φ ′′, and thus, we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′ ∨φ ′′K^ .
If we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′ ∨ φ ′′K^ , there exists σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω satisfying (σ · σ ′,k) |= φ ′ ∨ φ ′′. By Theorem 3.4 there exists
σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω satisfying ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,k) ≥ 0 or ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k) ≥ 0, and thus, we have sup(RoSI(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ ,k)) ≥ 0.
If we have inf(RoSI(φ ′∨φ ′′,σ ,k)) > 0, for any σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω , we have ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,k) > 0 or ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k) > 0. By Theorem 3.4
for any σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω , we have (σ · σ ′,k) |= φ ′ or (σ · σ ′,k) |= φ ′′. Therefore, we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′ ∨ φ ′′K□.
If we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′ ∨ φ ′′K□, for any σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω , we have (σ · σ ′,k) |= φ ′ ∨ φ ′′. By Theorem 3.4 for any σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω ,
we have ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,k) ≥ 0 or ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k) ≥ 0. Therefore, we have inf(RoSI(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ ,k)) ≥ 0.
When φ = Xφ ′, we have the following.
sup(RoSI(Xφ ′,σ ,k)) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(Xφ ′,σ · σ ,k) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ,k + 1)
= sup(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k + 1))
inf(RoSI(Xφ ′,σ ,k)) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(Xφ ′,σ · σ ,k) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ,k + 1)
= inf(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k + 1))
If we have sup(RoSI(Xφ ′,σ ,k)) = sup(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k + 1)) > 0, we have σ [k + 1, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′K^ and σ [k, |σ |] ∈ JXφ ′K^ .
If we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ JXφ ′K^ , we have σ [k + 1, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′K^ , therefore, we have sup(RoSI(Xφ ′,σ ,k)) = sup(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k +
1)) ≥ 0 and
If we have inf(RoSI(Xφ ′,σ ,k)) = inf(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k + 1)) > 0, we have σ [k + 1, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′K□ and σ [k, |σ |] ∈ JXφ ′K□.
If we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ JXφ ′K□, we have σ [k + 1, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′K□, therefore, we have inf(RoSI(Xφ ′,σ ,k)) = inf(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k +
1)) ≥ 0.
When φ = φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′, we have the following.
sup(RoSI(φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′,σ ,k))
= sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
min
(
ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l), min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m))
inf(RoSI(φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′,σ ,k))
= inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
min
(
ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l), min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m))
If we have sup(RoSI(φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′,σ ,k)) > 0, there exist σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω and l ∈ [k + i,k + j) such that we have ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l) > 0
and for anym ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l}, we have ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m) > 0. By Theorem 3.4, there exist σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω and l ∈ [k + i,k + j)
such that we have (σ · σ ′, l) |= φ ′′ and for anym ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l}, we have (σ · σ ′,m) |= φ ′. Therefore, there exist σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω
and l ∈ [k + i,k + j) satisfying (σ · σ ′,k) |= φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′ and we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′U[i, j) φ ′′K^
If we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′U[i, j) φ ′′K^ , there exist σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω and l ∈ [k + i,k + j) satisfying (σ · σ ′,k) |= φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′ and
we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′U[i, j) φ ′′K^ . Therefore, there exist σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω and l ∈ [k + i,k + j) such that we have (σ · σ ′, l) |= φ ′′
and for anym ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l}, we have (σ · σ ′,m) |= φ ′. By Theorem 3.4, there exist σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω and l ∈ [k + i,k + j)
such that we have ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l) ≥ 0 and for any m ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l}, we have ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m) ≥ 0, and thus, we have
sup(RoSI(φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′,σ ,k)) ≥ 0.
If we have inf(RoSI(φ ′U[i, j)φ ′′,σ ,k)) > 0, for anyσ ′ ∈ (RY )ω , there exists l ∈ [k+i,k+j) such thatwe have ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l) > 0
and for anym ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l}, we have ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m) > 0. By Theorem 3.4, for any σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω , there exists l ∈ [k + i,k + j)
such that we have (σ · σ ′, l) |= φ ′′ and for anym ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l}, we have (σ · σ ′,m) |= φ ′. Therefore, for any σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω ,
there exists l ∈ [k + i,k + j) satisfying (σ · σ ′,k) |= φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′ and we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′U[i, j) φ ′′K□
If we have σ [k, |σ |] ∈ Jφ ′U[i, j) φ ′′K□, for any σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω , there exists l ∈ [k + i,k + j) satisfying (σ · σ ′,k) |= φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′
Therefore, for any σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω , there exists l ∈ [k + i,k + j) such that we have (σ · σ ′, l) |= φ ′′ and for anym ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l},
we have (σ ·σ ′,m) |= φ ′. By Theorem 3.4, for any σ ′ ∈ (RY )ω , there exists l ∈ [k + i,k + j) such that we have ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l) ≥ 0
and for anym ∈ {k,k + 1, . . . , l}, we have ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m) ≥ 0. Thus, we have inf(RoSI(φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′,σ ,k)) ≥ 0. □
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.9
Theorem 3.9. Since both [ρ](φ,σ ,k) and RoSI(φ,σ ,k) are nonempty closed intervals, we have RoSI(φ,σ ,k) ⊆ [ρ](φ,σ ,k)
if and only if we have inf([ρ](φ,σ ,k)) ≤ inf(RoSI(φ,σ ,k)) ≤ sup(RoSI(φ,σ ,k)) ≤ sup([ρ](φ,σ ,k)). We prove the theorem by
induction on the structure of φ.
When φ = ⊤, we have sup(RoSI(⊤,σ ,k)) = inf(RoSI(⊤,σ ,k)) = +∞ and [ρ](φ,σ ,k) = [+∞,+∞]. Therefore, we have
[ρ](⊤,σ ,k) = RoSI(⊤,σ ,k).
When φ = y > c , we have the following.
sup(RoSI(y > c,σ ,k)) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(y > c,σ · σ ′,k) =
{
uk (y) − c if |σ | > k
+∞ if |σ | ≤ k
inf(RoSI(y > c,σ ,k)) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(y > c,σ · σ ′,k) =
{
uk (y) − c if |σ | > k
−∞ if |σ | ≤ k
Therefore, we have [ρ](y > c,σ ,k) = RoSI(y > c,σ ,k).
When φ = y < c , we have the following.
sup(RoSI(y < c,σ ,k)) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(y < c,σ · σ ′,k) =
{
−uk (y) + c if |σ | > k
+∞ if |σ | ≤ k
inf(RoSI(y < c,σ ,k)) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(y < c,σ · σ ′,k) =
{
−uk (y) + c if |σ | > k
−∞ if |σ | ≤ k
Therefore, we have [ρ](y < c,σ ,k) = RoSI(y < c,σ ,k).
When φ = ¬φ ′, we have the following.
sup(RoSI(¬φ ′,σ ,k)) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(¬φ ′,σ · σ ,k) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
−ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ,k)
= − inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ,k)
= − inf(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k))
inf(RoSI(¬φ ′,σ ,k)) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(¬φ ′,σ · σ ,k) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
−ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ,k)
= − sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ,k)
= − sup(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k))
Therefore, we have the following.
RoSI(¬φ ′,σ ,k) = −RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k) ⊆ −[ρ](φ ′,σ ,k) = [ρ](¬φ ′,σ ,k)
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When φ = φ ′ ∨ φ ′′, we have the following.
sup(RoSI(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ ,k)) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k)
= sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
max
{
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,k), ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k)}
= max
{
sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,k), sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k)}
= max
{
sup(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k)), sup(RoSI(φ ′′,σ ,k))}
≤ max{sup([ρ](φ ′,σ ,k)), sup([ρ](φ ′′,σ ,k))}
= sup([ρ](φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ ,k))
inf(RoSI(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ ,k)) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k)
= inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
max
{
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,k), ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k)}
≥ max{ inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,k), inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′,k)}
= max
{
inf(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k)), inf(RoSI(φ ′′,σ ,k))}
≥ max{inf([ρ](φ ′,σ ,k)), inf([ρ](φ ′′,σ ,k))}
= inf([ρ](φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ ,k))
Therefore, we have RoSI(φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ ,k) ⊆ [ρ](φ ′ ∨ φ ′′,σ ,k).
When φ = Xφ ′, we have the following.
sup(RoSI(Xφ ′,σ ,k)) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(Xφ ′,σ · σ ,k) = sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ,k + 1)
= sup(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k + 1))
inf(RoSI(Xφ ′,σ ,k)) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(Xφ ′,σ · σ ,k) = inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ,k + 1)
= inf(RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k + 1))
Therefore, we have the following.
RoSI(Xφ ′,σ ,k) = RoSI(φ ′,σ ,k + 1) ⊆ [ρ](φ ′,σ ,k + 1) = [ρ](Xφ ′,σ ,k)
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Table 5: The ratio of the time to falsify asmany properties asBreach. There is no entry forφ4 because the number
of falsified properties by Breach was not constant. The cells with N/A show that the method could not falsify as
many properties as Breach.
Breach/Random Breach/HC Breach/GA
φ1 N/A N/A 0.174747
φ2 0.0657534 0.0468933 0.0426136
φ3 2.40107 1.76962 1.74259
φ5 3.32821 3.43027 2.70304
φ6, tiny 1.39079 1.27869 0.880527
φ6,small 1.48069 1.7071 1.38028
φ6,medium N/A 3.10013 1.90094
φ6, large N/A 3.33556 2.88035
φ6,huge 5.2717 6.225 3.87649
φ6,gigantic 6.4918 2.98888 4.56795
φ7 0.363057 0.36248 0.24333
When φ = φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′, we have the following.
sup(RoSI(φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′,σ ,k))
= sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
min
(
ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l), min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m))
= sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
min
(
ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l), min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m))
≤ sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
min
(
sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l), sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m))
≤ sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
min
(
sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l), min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
sup
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m))
= sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
min
(
sup([ρ](φ ′′,σ , l)), min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
sup([ρ](φ ′,σ ,m)))
= sup([ρ](φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′,σ ,k))
inf(RoSI(φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′,σ ,k))
= inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
min
(
ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l), min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m))
≥ sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
min
(
ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l), min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m))
= sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
min
(
inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l), inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m))
= sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
min
(
inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′′,σ · σ ′, l), min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
inf
σ ′∈(RY )ω
ρ(φ ′,σ · σ ′,m))
= sup
l ∈[k+i,k+j)
min
(
inf([ρ](φ ′′,σ , l)), min
m∈{k,k+1, ...,l }
inf([ρ](φ ′,σ ,m)))
= inf([ρ](φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′,σ ,k))
Therefore, we have RoSI(φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′,σ ,k) ⊆ [ρ](φ ′U[i, j) φ ′′,σ ,k). □
B OMITTED EXPERIMENT RESULT
Table 5 shows the ratio of the time to falsify as many properties as Breach.
